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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
WESLEY 0. BAYLES,

;)

Petitioner/Appellant,

]

vs.

]

LINDA CARYL BAYLES,

]

Respondent/Appellee.

Appeals Case No. 20070334
Second District Court No. 004702059

)

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The jurisdiction of this case is vested with the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(h), and pursuant to Rules 3(a) and 4(a) of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
Issue 1. Petitioner/Appellant has failed to marshall the evidence against the
trial court'sfindingsof fact
Issue 2. The trial court was not attempting to interpret California Residential
Purchase Agreements but was determining Respondent's obligation to Petitioner when he
exercised his right of first refusal. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it refiised
1

to order specific performance.
Issue 3. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it ordered that each
party continue to pay a portion of the cost for the survivor benefit, but awarded Mr. Bayles
a parcel of property as an offset for the expense of the survivor benefit.
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard
shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.
Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; Sigg v. Sigg, 905 P.2d 908 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).
In order to overturn the District Court's findings of fact, the appellant must "marshall the
evidence in support of the findings and then demonstrate that despite this evidence, the trial
court's findings are so lacking in support as to be 'against the clear weight of the evidence,'
thus making them 'clearly erroneous'." Hagan v. Hagan, 810 P.2d 478 (Utah Ct App. 1991)
(citations omitted).
The District Court's legal conclusions are reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
Sigg v. Sigg, 905 P.2d 908, 912. " 'A trial court has considerable discretion considering
property [division] in a divorce proceeding, thus its actions enjoy a presumption of validity.'
We will disturb the trial court's division only ifthere is a misunderstanding or misapplication
of the law such that a manifest injustice or inequity results, indicating an abuse of discretion.
Oliekan v. Oliekan, 2006 UT App 405, % 16, 147 P.2d 464, quoting Elman v. Elman, 2002
UT App 83,1fl7, 45 P.3d 176.
"Trial courts may exercise broad discretion in adjusting thefinancialinterests
2

of parties to divorce and modification proceedings, so long as the decision is within the
confines of'legal precedence....1! VI it in »i luiiil u imi ill IIIII^ ixcicisi1 Inoad ilisuilioiii i'i
presume the correctness of the court's decision absent 'manifest injustice or inequity that
indicates a clear abuse of .discretion'." Crockett v. Crockett, 836 P.2d 818, 819 (Utah Ct.
App. 1992), quoting Hansen v. Hansen

<

30 (utar

.f.

h

DETERMINATIVE LAW
Utah Code Ann. §30-3-5(1) states: "When a decree of divorce is rendered, the
court may include in it equitable r^Hers ^eh^r
obligations, .i I it I | will us

*~ the
•-•

^ndren, property, debts or
Vt

•* • continuing

jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or new orders for the custody of the children and
their support, maintenance, health, and dental care, and for distribution of the property and
obligations for debts as is reasonable and necessary "I"" (I miphasis added. I
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This appeal follows a trial held on July 3, 2006 and July 5, 2006, before the
Honorable Thomas L. Kay, District Court Judge, on Petitioner's Petition to Modify Decree
o

• orce and on isstit s a ililii dil hoin di (fiiium III tiimi on iii I hilli. i lo Show I 'nisi

tin

Petitioner/Appellant objects to the provisions of the Court's Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law and Order Modifying Decree of Divorce concerning allocation of
payment for Respondent's survivor bench I m Pctilionci 'siehieinenl, »(H sale oi disposition
of one remaining parcel of marital property located in the State of California, and regarding

3

the obligations of the parties in connection with the sale of marital properties of the parties
located in the State of California.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. The parties were divorced following a trial on October 1-2, 2002. Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and a Decree of Divorce, were entered on November 25,
2002. (Record on Appeal, pages 148 gt seq. and pages 167 et seq.) (See copies in the
Addendum).
2. At the time of the divorce, the parties owned multiple parcels of property
in Yuba County, California. The Court found in f24 of its Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law: "In light of the parties' past payment and debt history, the above-mentioned
California properties should be sold as soon as possible." (Record on Appeal, page 153).
3. The Court further found in % 15 of its Decree of Divorce:
15. The petitioner is awarded a right of first refusal for the purchase of any
and all of the California properties. Upon acceptance of any bona fide offer
to purchase a California property, the petitioner shall receive written notice of
the acceptance of the offer and shall have thirty (30) daysfromthe receipt of
said notice to provide written notice of his election to purchase the property
on the same terms as the bona fide offer. If petitioner exercises the right of
first refusal, he shall pay the respondent the amount she would receive from
the sale of that parcel, said payment to be made within 30 days of the time he
exercises his right of first refusal.
4. Subsequent to the divorce, an evidentiary hearing was held on November
10,2004, and Petitioner appealedfromthe Order entered after that hearing. In case number
20041133, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Order of the District Court.
5. The case came before the District Court again on July 3,2006 and July 5,
4

2006 as a post-divorce proceeding to modify the decree of divorce and to resolve issues
certified from a hearing ii11 in (Jul* i In Shin t I .muse.
6. At the time of trial in 2006, Petitioner was under an order to pay alimony
to Respondent, but he had not paid alimony since May, 2005 (almost one year after he filed
y s p e fiti on i0 modify). (Finding of Fact f8 nl Rvan d on Appeal page -143, Transcript o

I

July 3 & 5, 2006 page 296, lines 21-23).
7

The Court found that despite receiving no alimony since May, 2005,

Respondent had been able to 'hold her own from May, 2005 through the date of trial, July
3, 2006 (Finding of Fact | 8 at Record on Appeal page 443; Transcript of trial July 3 & 5,
2006 page 296, line 25 through page 297, line 10).
8. The Court found that Petitioner no longer had the ability to pay alimony;
e yen if the Respondent needed alimony, Petitioner could nol piiy alimony (Finding of Fncl
%9 at Record on Appeal page 443; Transcript of trial July 3 & 5, 2006 page 297, line 14-21;
page 129, line 22 through page 130, line 24; page 185, lines 22-24; page 186, line 15 through
page 18 1 ' ,

ougli pi i.

lage 241 line 23 through |>ug<

242, line 7).
9. Petitioner retired from the IRS on a medical disability after the trial of the

by the Court in the Decree of Divorce. Respondent receives twenty-one per cent. (21%) of
Petitioner's retirement benefit as her Woodward share. (Decree of Divorce f25, page 173
of record on appeal; transcript of trial July j<K3, 2006 page 26, lines 10 through page 27,
5

line 8; page 28, line 13-16).
10. In the Decree of Divorce, Petitioner was ordered to elect a full survivor
benefit for his retirement pending further order of the Court. Decree of Divorce f 26 (page
173 of record on appeal)
11. At the time of divorce, the Court reserved for future determination the
amount of survivor benefits to be awarded to the Respondent and the issue of which party
should pay the monthly cost for the survivor benefits. (Decree of Divorce f26, page 173 of
record on appeal).
12. The monthly cost of Respondent's survivor benefits is approximately
$272.00 per month. The cost of the survivor benefit is deductedfromthe retirement before
it is divided pursuant to the Woodward formula, and before either party is paid their share
of the retirement. Respondent pays a proportion of the cost of the survivor benefit by virtue
of a proportional reduction of her Woodward share of the retirement benefit. The court
ordered that the survivor benefit be paid as it has since Petitioner's retirement, and did not
adjust the allocation of the cost of the survivor benefit. (Finding of Fact f 11 at Record on
Appeal page 443; Transcript of trial July 3 & 5, 2006 page 30, lines 11-12; page 34, lines 318; page 109, lines 1-4; page 197, lines 17-22; page 254, lines 14-16, page 276, line 2
through page 277, line 16).
13. In the Decree of Divorce, the parties were ordered to sell all parcels of
property in California, and divide the proceeds; and each party was given a right of first
refusal to purchase any of the properties.

At the time of trial on the modification
6

proceeding, one parcel of California property remained, which the parties referred to as the
"five-acre parcel". (Transcript of trial July 3 & 5, 2006 page 85, lines 11-19).
14. The property taxes on thefive-acreparcel were delinquent. (Transcript
of trial July 3 & 5, 2006 page 64, lines 4-7; page 65, line 21 through page 66, line 4; page
161, lines 3-6),
15. The parties had received offers to purchase thefive-acreparcel, but the
property had never been sold. (Transcript of trial July 3 & 5, 2006 page 85, line 21 et seq.;
page 91, line 1 through page 92, line 92; page 96, lines 2-22).
16. The Court awarded the remaining California property, thefive-acreparcel,
to Respondent as an offset for the allocation of the cost of the survivor benefit, to provide
him a source of funds from which to pay the survivor benefit (or to recoup the cost he pays
for the survivor benefit). Based on the estimated value of the five acre parcel and the cost
of the survivor benefit, if Petitioner lives 20 more years, the cost of the survivor benefit to
Petitioner should approximate the value of thefive-acreparcel. (Finding of Fact ^f 12 at
Record on Appeal page 444-445 ; Transcript of trial July 3 & 5, 2006 page 97, lines 11-12;
page 150, lines 5-20; page 165, lines 14-19; page 198, line 18 through page 199, line 2, lines
20-22, page 234, line 11-15; page 242, lines 1-11).
17. Respondent accepted offers to purchase several of the California parcels
from third parties; those offers included standard terms and conditions for sales to third
parties, including a requirement for a grant deed and title insurance. Respondent would have
been obligated to pay a real estate commission to her realtor if those sales to third parties had
7

been consummated. (Transcript of trial July 3 & 5, 2006 page 74, lines 7-8; page 75, lines
13-18; page 76, lines 7-11; page 89, line 18 through page 90, line 8;).
18. Petitioner exercised his right of first refusal to purchase three parcels of
property owned by the parties. (Transcript of trial July 3 & 5,2006 page 74, lines 1-9; page
75, lines 13-20; page 76, lines 7-13).
19. Petitioner tendered payment to Respondent for her interest in each parcel.
Respondent did not comply with all terms of the sales contracts entered with third party
buyers when she accepted Petitioner's payment for his exercise of the right of first refusal.
Only after tendering payment, Petitioner demanded that Respondent comply with all terms
of the sales contracts as those contracts were written with third parties. Petitioner did not
put Respondent on notice of his intention to require her to comply with all terms of the sales
contracts until after he tendered his payments. Having failed to put Respondent on notice
to perform all the terms of the contracts, Petitioner waived his right to demand performance
and the Court refused to order Respondent to perform all the terms of the contracts.
Respondent's only obligation was to provide Petitioner with a deed of the same quality with
which the parties obtained title to the property; i.e., if the parties held title by a grant deed,
Respondent should provide Petitioner with a grant deed, and if they held title by a quit claim
deed, Respondent should provide Petitioner with a quit claim deed. Petitioner was not
entitled to get better title than he had before purchasing the interest of Respondent in the
property. (Transcript of trial July 3 & 5, 2006 page 104, line 13 through Page 107, line 7;
page 141, line 2 through page 142, line 8; page 144, lines 9-25; page 245, line 2 through page
8

146, line 18; page 201, line 12 through page 203, line 18; page 204, lines 10-24; page 207,
lines 14-25; page 208, lines 1-15; page 228, line 17 through page 229, line 12).
20. The trial court found that the terms of the sales contracts were more of a
technicality than what the bargain was, and refused to order Respondent to comply
specifically with the terms of the sales contracts. (Transcript of trial July 3 & 5,2006 page
230, lines 3-21; page 259, lines 13-19; page 263,lines 17-23).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1. The Petitioner/Appellant has the burden to "marshall the evidence in support
of thefindingsand then demonstrate that despite this evidence, die trial court's findings are
so lacking in support as to be 'against the clear weight of the evidence,' thus making them
'clearly erroneous'." Hagan v. Hagan, 810 P.2D 478 (Utah App. 1991). He has failed to
meet this burden, and thus the Court must assume that thefindingsof fact of the trial court
are supported by the record.
2. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that Respondent did not
have to comply with the terms of sales contracts other than providing Petitioner with an
appropriate deed, and refusing to find Respondent in contempt for not complying with all
terms contained in the sales of the various California parcels.
3. It was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to enter one order in
which the court terminated alimony, ordered that there would be no change in the payment
of the cost of the survivor benefit for Respondent on Petitioner's retirement, and as an offset
to the amount Petitioner is ordered to pay for the retirement, awarded Petitioner the entire
9

five-acre parcel of California property. This financial package must be looked at in its
entirety, and in its entirety it is equitable. This order carried out the trial court's intention
to equally divide between the parties the value of the marital properties.
ARGUMENT
I. PETITIONER/APPELLANT HAS FAILED TO
MARSHALL THE EVIDENCE AGAINST THE
TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT,
The Petitioner/Appellant fails to meet the standard of appellate review to overturn the
trial court's decision. He has the burden to "marshall the evidence in support of the findings
and then demonstrate that despite this evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking in
support as to be 'against the clear weight of the evidence/ thus making them 'clearly
erroneous'." Hagan v. Hagan, 810 P.2D 478 (Utah App. 1991).
Mr. Bayles has not, in "comprehensive and fastidious order, [marshaled] every scrap
of competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the very findings [he] resists."
Moon v. Moon, 973 P. 2d 431, 437 (Utah App. 1999) Instead of meeting his burden, Mr.
Bayles simply states the facts as he wanted them to be. In cases such as this, the Court has
stated that it will" . . .[assume] that the record supports thefindingsof the trial court and
[this Court] proceeds to a review of the accuracy of the lower court's conclusions of law and
the application of that law to the case." Shepherd v. Shepherd, 876 P.2d 429,432 (Utah App.
1994).

Even if Mr. Bayles had met the first prong of marshalling the evidence, he has

failed to met the second prong, which calls for an analysis to expose any "fatal flaw in the
evidence" sufficient to overturn the trial court'sfindings.Moon, 973 P.2d 431, 437.
10

Since Mr. Bayles has not met his burden, this court should find the trial court's
findings are supported by the record.
n. THE TRIAL COURT WAS NOT ATTEMPTING TO INTERPRET
CALIFORNIA RESIDENTIAL PURCHASE AGREEMENTS BUT WAS
DETERMINING RESPONDENT'S OBLIGATION TO PETITIONER
WHEN HE EXERCISED HIS RIGHT OF FIRST REFUSAL. THE COURT
DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION
WHEN IT REFUSED TO ORDER SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.
The Petitioner is attempting to raise again the issues raised, at least in part, and
determined, in the prior appeal ofthis case concerning Respondent's obligations to Petitioner
in connection with Petitioner's exercise of a right of first refusal to purchase Respondent's
interest in certain marital properties located in California. To the extent those issues are
raised again here, they are res judicata.
The trial court was not asked to interpret California Residential Purchase
Agreements, nor did the Court do so. The Court was asked to determine whether
Respondent should be required to provide additional services or benefits to Petitioner after
he exercised his right of first refusal to purchase Respondent's interest in certain marital
properties located in California, after tendering his payment to Respondent for her interest.
In essence, the Court was asked to interpret its own intention as embodied in
the Decree of Divorce concerning the respective rights and duties of the parties. Mr. Bayles
argues that there was a contract between himself and Mrs. Bayles for each parcel of property
when he exercised his right offirstrefusal and purchased her interest in those properties. No
evidence was presented to the trial court that would create any contract between Mr. Bayles
11

and Mrs. Bayles concerning those properties, and no evidence is cited by Mr. Bayles other
than the existence of certain contracts with third parties for the purchase of those marital
properties.
The trial court made a specific finding that "if Petitioner wished to have
Respondent comply with the terms of the sales contracts, then Petitioner should have done
them prior to the time he sent payment." The court further found that "Petitioner did not
demand compliance with the terms of the sales contracts until after payment had been made."
Finding of Fact f 13, Record on Appeal page 445. As Mr. Bayles has failed to marshal the
evidence against these findings, they are deemed to be supported by the record; further, his
own statement of facts in his brief acknowledges that he did not demand compliance prior
to making payment.
Even if Mr. Bayles was entitled, under equity and under the terms of the
Decree of Divorce, to insist that Mrs. Bayles perform all terms of the sales contracts with
third parties when he purchased her interest, he waived hisrightto demand compliance with
all those terms. In Tanner v. Baadsgaard, 612 P.2d 345 (Utah 1980), the seller (defendant
in that case) was found to have waived strict compliance with the terms of the contract
concerning time of payment, and specific performance was ordered. In the case at hand, Mr.
Bayles waived any right to demand strict compliance (if he even had the right to demand
strict compliance with the third-party contract) by tendering payment before demanding
compliance. He has received title to the properties, and Mrs. Bayles has received her
payment; each party has received the benefit contemplated by the Decree of Divorce. This
12

results in an equitable division of marital properties which lies within the sound discretion
of the trial court, and which division should not be disturbed on appeal.
ffl. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION
WHEN IT ORDERED THAT EACH PARTY CONTINUE TO PAY A PORTION
OF THE COST FOR THE SURVIVOR BENEFIT BUT AWARDED MR. BAYLES
A PARCEL OF PROPERTY AS AN OFFSET
FOR THE EXPENSE OF THE SURVIVOR BENEFIT.
To the extent that Mr. Bayles' brief seems to challenge the underlying division
of retirement in this case, it is untimely, as that initial division was made in the original
Decree of Divorce and was never challenged. The issue which was actually tried before the
trial court concerning retirement, and the only issue concerning retirement which can be
considered here, is the allocation of the monthly cost to maintain a survivor benefit for
Respondent. This brief addresses that issue.
It was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to enter one unified order
in which the court terminated alimony; ordered that there would be no change in the payment
of the cost of the survivor benefit for Respondent on Petitioner's retirement; and as an offset
to the amount Petitioner is ordered to pay for the retirement, awarded Petitioner the entire
five-acre parcel of California properly. The court crafted a composite solution to resolve
several outstanding issues, and the court's order must be looked at as a whole, without
isolating one or two items. Petitioner asks the court to strike down one part of this package,
without addressing thefive-acreparcel of property which was clearly awarded to Petitioner
as an offset (emphasis added). While the trial court did not relieve Petitioner of the
13

responsibility to pay some (not all) of the cost of the survivor benefit which clearly will only
benefit Respondent, the trial court gave Petitioner an asset with an estimated value of
$30,000. Petitioner has the ability to immediately sell that property and use the proceeds
however he chooses; this includes $15,000 which otherwise would have belonged to
Respondent based on the Decree of Divorce ordering the parties to share equally the
proceeds of the properties. The testimony clearly showed that Respondent was in need of
the survivor benefit, but had no ability to pay directly for the survivor benefit.
Utah case law clearly favors an avoidance of continuing joint ownership in
marital assets whenever possible. Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P.2d 431 (Utah 1982);
Parker v. Parker, 996 P.2d 565 (Utah Ct. App. 2000). This case is a prime example of the
wisdom of this policy, but not, as Mr. Bayles suggests, concerning the retirement. Rather,
it is the California real estate which has generated the most problems between the parties.
Therefore, an approach which allocates, once and for all, the final remaining California
parcel, which remained unsold almost four years after the divorce became final, was not only
within the sound discretion of the trial court, but a wise move to avoid future entanglements
and disputes between the parties. As in Parker, the trial court's "disposition concerning this
asset properly disentangled the (parties) from future acrimonious business involvement."
996 p.2d 565,570,1(19.
Further, despite Mr. Bayles' assertion to the contrary, this case exactlyfitsinto
the Woodward mold. Mr. Bayles' retirement benefit is not a liquidated fund; "...where no
present value can be established and the parties are unable to reach agreement, resort must
14

be had to a deferred distribution based upon fixed percentages." 656 P.2d 431, 433. That
fixed percentage has also applied in this case to the amount each party pays for Respondent's
survivor benefit, due to the way the cost is calculated and paid. The case ofMotes v. Motes,
786 P.2d 232 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) is apropos, as Mr. Motes was already retired at the time
the decree of divorce was entered, and he was receiving monthly retirement benefits. As the
Court stated in Motes, "Treatment of such benefits is less problematic than in the usual case.
The present value of plaintiff's share of the now-fixed stream of income, which the benefits
have become, can be readily calculated and compensated for with distribution of other assets
having an equivalent value or cashed out over a comparatively short time. That failing,
provision can simply be made for plaintiff to receive her share monthly...." Id, 786 P.2d 232,
234. Mrs. Bayles currently receives her share of the retirement stream of income monthly;
she also pays a proportionate share of the cost for her survivor benefit monthly, which
reduces her share of the monthly retirement stream. The Court exercised sound discretion
in using another asset (thefive-acreparcel) to compensate Mr. Bayles for the amount he pays
monthly for the cost of the survivor benefit.
This case raises an issue previously addressed in Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166
(Utah Ct. App. 1990). In that case, Mrs. Burt also sought a share of the survivor annuity
benefit incident to Mr. Burt's government retirement benefit. At footnote 8, the court stated
that "while a present settlement is preferable, the trial court may award the defendant a share
of the income streamfromthe retirement benefits as they are paid, not in the form of alimony
but as a property award not terminable upon remarriage." The cost for the survivor annuity
15

benefit was treated in a similar fashion, "fixing a present value and considering that sum in
the distribution scheme, or awarding the defendant an interest in the annuity to protect her
right to continued payment of the retirement income." 799 P.2d 1166, 1171. In the instant
case, the trial court considered the present value of die future cost to preserve the survivor
annuity benefit, and considered that present value in awarding Mr. Bayles the five-acre
parcel of property but ordering that he continue to bear the burden of 79% of the cost of the
survivor benefit.
The trial court in this case, in the sound exercise of its discretion, fashioned
an equitable solution which not only resolved the issue of the continuing payment for the
survivor benefit, but also once and for all removed as a bone of contention between the
parties the final parcel of California property which remained unsold. The total award is not
an abuse of discretion and should be affirmed.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Bayles has failed in his initial burden of marshalling the evidence in
support of the findings of the trial Court, and therefore the Court on appeal should not reach
the merits of his case. However, to the extent that he had the right to demand that Mrs.
Bayles comply with the terms of contracts entered into with third parties, he waived the right
to demand compliance when he tendered payment before making such demands. The trial
court admirably met its burden of equitably dividing the marital properties of the parties
when it preserved the existing payment structure for the cost of Mrs. Bayles' survivor
benefit, but awarded Mr. Bayles the five-acre parcel as an offset to cost he pays. The
16

allocation of payment for the survivor benefit cannot be considered in a vacuum, but only
in context of the entire order, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in entering that
order. The Order Modifying Decree of Divorce should be affirmed.
DATED this < 2_ day of _

2007.

JUD^
AttomeV/orti^Respondent-Appellee
Linda <2aryl Bayles

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Judy Dawn Barking, certify that on the

y day of October, 2007,1 served

a copy of the attached Brief of the Respondent/Appellee upon Wesley O. Bayles,
Petitioner/Appellant pro se in this matter, by mailing to him by first class mail with sufficient
postage prepaid to the following address:
Wesley O. Bayles
P.O. Box 357
Forbestown, CA 95941
G
Respondent/Appellee
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ADDENDUM

18

FILED
E. NORDELL WEEKS (3412)
ERIC N. WEEKS (7340)
WEEKS LAW FIRM
Attorneys for Petitioner
1050 Walker Terrace
19 East 200 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 322-2800

V 25 2002
tayton District Court
Divorce Decree

004702059

VD10820269
B A Y L E S LINDA

CAFcD

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
WESLEY O. BAYLES,
DECREE OF DIVORCE
Petitioner,
VS,

Civil No. 004702059 DA
LINDA CARYL BAYLES,
Judge Thomas L. Kay
Respondent.

The above-entitled matter was heard before the Honorable
Thomas L. Kay, Judge of the above-entitled court, pursuant to a
trial held on October 1 and October 2, 2002.

The Court, having

reviewed the documents~"and"~pleadings on file herein, having heard
argument and testimony, and being fully advised as to both the
evidence and law pertaining thereto, and having previously entered
its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, now, therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, as follows:
1. The parties are subject to the jurisdiction of this
Court as set forth above in the Court's Findings of Fact.
2. The petitioner should be granted a Decree of Divorce
from the respondent on the grounds of irreconcilable differences
effective October 2, 2002.

Children of the Parties
3 . The petitioner is not obligated to pay child support
to the respondent in regards to Andrew Vincent Salazar and BreAnna
Rosa Flores Salazar.
Health Insurance
4. Each party shall maintain their own health, accident,
hospitalization and dental insurance.

The petitioner shall

provide any necessary cooperation in respondent's obtaining for
her benefit continued health, accident, hospitalization and dental
insurance coverage under the federal C.O.B.R.A. legislation, at
the sole cost of the respondent.
5. The respondent shall be entitled to receive the
insurance check in the amount of $1,636.03 in satisfaction of the
$1,312.50 owing pursuant to the Commissioner's earlier
recommendation.

The check has already been delivered to the

respondent as satisfaction of said obligation.
Debts and Obligations
6. The respondent is required to pay and hold petitioner
harmless on the debts owing on the Providian Card, the Citibank
card, the Chase/Walmart Card, and the MBNA card.
7. The petitioner is required to pay and hold the
respondent harmless on the debts owing on the America First Credit
Union Visa card, the line of credit at America First Credit Union,
and the Firestone/account.
8. Since the separation of the parties, the petitioner
has paid approximately $61,000 toward the marital debt obligations
that existed at the time of separation.

The petitioner shall not

receive any credit or offset in the marital settlement for such
payments.
Real Property
9. The Bountiful Residence is awarded to the petitioner
subject to the debt thereon.

The respondent shall execute a

quitclaim deed in favor of the petitioner or other documents
necessary to relinquish her interest in the Bountiful Residence.
10.

The petitioner is permitted to sell the Bountiful

Residence, with the respondent having no further claim or interest
therein.

The petitioner shall be permitted to retain any profit

or be responsible for any loss associated with any sale thereof.
Respondent shall cooperate in executing any documents and taking
any steps necessary to allow the petitioner to proceed with the
sale and transfer of the Residence.
11.

The respondent is not responsible for payment of

the first and second mortgage on the Bountiful Residence for the
period she resided in the Residence from the date of separation
through the time she moved to Oklahoma in August 2001.
12.

The parties jointly hold certain other real

property, namely (a) Parcel 1 of land and associated improvements
located at 10692 Forbestown Road, Yuba County, California; (b)
Parcel 13 of land and associated improvements located at 10747
Forbestown Road, Yuba County, California; (c) Parcel 15 of land
and associated improvements located at 10695 Forbestown Road, Yuba
County, California; (d) Parcel 16 of land and associated
improvements located at 10691 Forbestown Road, Yuba County,
California; (e) Parcels 8 and 10 of land located in Yuba County,

California, also known as the Beehive Mine; and (f) Parcel 2 of
land located in Yuba County, California, also known as Parcels 22
& 23.
13.

The above-mentioned California properties shall be

sold as soon as possible.
14.

The petitioner is hereinafter entitled to retain

the rental income from Parcels 1 and 15 and is obligated to
maintain the monthly payments on the mortgages for said parcels
through the date of sale of said properties.
15.

The petitioner is awarded a right of first refusal

for the purchase of any and all of the California properties.
Upon acceptance of any bona fide offer to purchase a California
property, the petitioner shall receive written notice of the
acceptance of the offer and shall have thirty (3 0) days from the
receipt of said notice to provide written notice of his election
to purchase the property on the same terms as the bona fide offer.
If petitioner exercises the right of first refusal, he shall pay
the respondent the amount she would receive from the sale of that
parcel, said payment to be made within 3 0 days of the time he
exercises his right of first refusal.
16.
first refusal.

The respondent is awarded a secondary right of
In the event that the petitioner fails to exercise

his right of first refusal within thirty (30) days following his
receipt of notice,of acceptance of a bona fide offer, the
respondent shall thereafter have thirty (3 0) days to provide
written notice of her election to purchase the property on the
same terms as the bona fide offer.
4

If respondent exercises her

right of first refusal, she shall pay the petitioner the amount he
would receive from the sale of that parcel, said payment to be
made within 3 0 days of the time she exercises her right of first
refusal.
17.

At the time of closing on the sale of each

California property, proceeds from the sale shall first be applied
to pay any and all closing costs, real estate commissions or fees,
and any existing mortgage obligations owing, including any tax
and/or debt delinquencies owed in relation to the property.

After

such costs have been paid, the petitioner shall be entitled to
receive one-half of the total amount of payments he has made
toward delinquent and current taxes on the property and, as
applicable, one-half of the total amount he has paid toward the
mortgage obligations in the property commencing with the month of
October 2 002 through the date of sale.

Any and all remaining

proceeds from the sale of the property shall be split equally
between the parties.
18.

The real property and improvements located at

(a) 1441 Michigan Avenue, Salt Lake City, Utah, and (b) Blanding,
Utah, are the separate, inherited property of the petitioner.
Personal Property
19.

The respondent is awarded those personal heirlooms

located at the California properties, namely plates, platters,
clocks, and lamps^

The ski pole in the possession of the

petitioner is a family heirloom of the respondent and respondent
is awarded the ski pole.

Petitioner is permitted to make a model

of the ski pole and shall deliver possession of the ski pole to

the respondent within 90 days of entry of this Decree at her place
of residence and at the expense of the petitioner.
20.

The remainder of the personal property is awarded

to the parties as currently divided.
21.

The $15,000 previously paid to the respondent shall

be considered an offset for the additional value of personal
property received by the petitioner.
Alimony
22.

The petitioner has made monthly payments to the

respondent from the date of separation, including the total amount
of $8,337 in monthly payments during the period from February 14,
2002 through the month of October 2002.

These payments shall be

considered temporary alimony.
23.

Commencing with the month of November 2002, the

petitioner is hereinafter obligated to pay alimony to the
respondent in the monthly amount of $1,000, payable one-half on
the 5^-of- the month and one-half on the 20th of each month, to
continue until alimony is reviewed at the time of petitioner's
retirement.

Alimony shall terminate as determined by the Court or

upon the marriage or cohabitation of the respondent, the death of
either party, or upon the occurrence of any event, which, under
Utah law, shall cause alimony to cease.
24.

The alimony award shall be reviewed at the time of

petitioner's retirement.

Based upon the current circumstances of

the parties, petitioner's retirement shall be considered to be a
sufficient basis to permit a review of alimony.

At the time of

review, the Court shall make determinations as to whether the

monthly alimony payments will be modified or discontinued.

Such

review shall be made in conjunction with review of the issues
related to payment of the retirement and survivor benefits set
forth in the following section.
Pensions and Retirement Benefits
25.

The petitioner has acquired pension and retirement

funds prior to and during the term of the marriage of the parties.
The respondent is entitled to receive one-half (1/2) of the
petitioner's pension and retirement funds which were accrued
during the term of the marriage pursuant to the Woodward formula
and a Qualified Domestic Relations Order shall issue in
association therewith.
26.

The petitioner's retirement plan includes an option

to elect either full or partial survivor benefits.

The Court

finds that election of a survivor benefit will decrease the total
monthly benefit payment under petitioner's pension and retirement
plan in an amount that cannot be calculated to an exact amount at
this time.

The Court reserves for future determination the issue

of the amount of survivor benefits to be awarded to the respondent
and the issue of which party shall pay the monthly cost.

Such

determination shall be made at the time of petitioner's
retirement, subject to the provision of the following paragraph.
27.

In order to avoid forfeiture of the ability to

elect a full survivor benefit, the petitioner shall not elect a
reduced survivor benefit prior to the Court's determination
pursuant to the provision in paragraph 26, above.

Life Insurance
28.

The respondent shall be listed as a one-half-

interest beneficiary on the currently existing life insurance
policy on petitioner's life.
Attorney's Fees
29.

The petitioner shall pay $1,500 toward respondent's

attorney's fees by December 2, 2002.

The respondent is ordered to

assume and pay the remainder of her own costs and attorney's fees
incurred herein.

The petitioner is ordered to assume cind pay his

own costs and attorney's fees incurred herein.
Miscellaneous Provisions
30.

Each party is ordered to execute and deliver to the

other party any documents required to implement or support the
provisions of this Decree.
MADE AND ENTERED this

K

_2' day of November, 20 02.

BY THE COURT:

*

i

1
7^-

HONORABLE THOMAS L. KAY
District Court Judge
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Michael D. Murphy (#5115)
Attorney for Petitioner
13 North Main
P.O. Box 15
Kaysville, Utah 84 03 7
(801) 547-9274

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
WESLEY 6.

BAYLES,

vs.

)
)
)
)
)

LINDA CARYL BAYLES,

).'

Petitioner

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

)

Civil No. 004702059

)

Respondent.

)

Judge Thomas L. Kay

This matter came on regularly scheduled before this Court
for trial on July 3, 2006, the Honorable Thomas L. Kay, District
Court Judge, presiding.
by

his

attorney,

Petitioner was present and represented

Michael

D.

Murphy,

and

the

Respondent

was

present ~and represented by her attorney, Judy Dawn Barking.

The

Court, atter hearing argument and testimony and having reviewed
the parties' exhibits,and being fully advised in the premises,
now makes and enters on July 5, 2006 the following Findings of
Fact:andlConclusions of Law.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.
or

not

The court finds that the issues in this case is whether
Petitioner

Respondent

and

should

what,

if

continue

any,

money

to
that

pay

alimony

Petitioner

Respondent since June of 2004 should be paid back.
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of law

to

the

has paid

2.

The Court

finds

that

the second

issue

the Court

is

considering is who should pay for the survivor benefits and if
Respondent

should

reimburse

the

Petitioner

for

the

survivor

benefits that he paid since the filing of the Petition to Modify
on June, 2 004.
3.

The third issue is the parcels of property and whether

or not the Respondent should strictly comply with the terms and
conditions which accompanied the various post divorce sales of
the various parcels of property.
4.

The

fourth

issue

is

what

should

be

done

with

the

remaining unsold five-acre parcel.
5. The fifth issue is who should be ordered to pay attorney
fees in this matter.
6.

The

sixth

issue

is

who

should

be

responsible

for

transportation costs and costs of trial.
7.

The remaining issue of whether or not Petitioner should

continue to maintain the Respondent as a beneficiary on his life
-Insurance-policy has been stipulated and the parties

stipulate

that Petitioner should no longer be obligated to carry Respondent
as a beneficiary on his life insurance policy.

was,

8.

In regards to alimony, the Court finds that Petitioner

at

the time of October 2002,

Internal Revenue Service.

emplovpd

full

time at the

Petitioner had not had his disability

rating from IRS prior to the trial and was earning almost twice
per month at the time of the entry of the Decree of

R s v l f c v Rsv1f»c

Divorce than he is earning now.

The Court further finds that

Petitioner filed the Petition to Modify in June of 2004 and that
he was current in his monthly alimony through May of 2005.

The

Court further finds that from May of 2 005, Respondent has been
able to hold her own.
9.

The

ability

Court

to pay

finds

that

alimony.

should terminate.

Petitioner

Petitioner

is

no

longer

disabled

and

has

the

alimony

The Court finds that the parties' incomes are

substantially similar and there is no way that alimony can be
justified.

Even

if the

Respondent

needs

alimony,

Petitioner

cannot pay alimony.
10. The Court finds that $12,000 of alimony has been paid
from the time of the motion to modify in June of 2 004 through May
of 2005. The Court finds that what alimony has been paid has been
paid.

The Court further finds that it is not appropriate under

the circumstances of this case to order that the alimony that was
paid has to be repaid.
on-going- -al-imonyv or

Both parties shall go forward with no
with no

alimony

to be

refunded

or

no

alimony due.
11.

In regard to the survivor benefits, the Court finds

that the cost of the survivor benefits is approximately $272.00
per month and the issue is who should pay for those survivor
benefits.

Respondent already pays a proportion of the cost of

the Survivor Benefit by virtue of a proportional reduction of her
Woodward share of the retirement benefit. Respondent will benefit
by those survivor benefits.

She currently receives $599.00 per

month and that amount will be increased annually pursuant to cost
of living increases.
Respondent's

If Petitioner dies prior to the Respondent,

survivor

benefits

would

triple.

The

Court

sees

arguments of the parties both ways in determining who should be
obligated to pay for the survivor benefits and finds an argument
can be made for splitting it down the middle.

The Court finds

that the survivor benefit has been chosen and has to continue and
that Petitioner should be ordered to pay for it just as it has
been in the past.
back

survivor

Respondent will have no obligation to pay any

benefit

payments. Respondent

currently

receives

$599.00 per month as her Woodward share of the retirement and
that amount will be increased annually pursuant to annual cost of
living increases.
12. As an off-set of the survivor benefits being paid as
they currently are, Petitioner shall receive the five acre parcel
of

property,

free

and

clear of

subject to any debt thereon.

any claim

by

the Respondent,

Petitioner will have full authority

-to-sel-1—the—five -acre parcel and receive all monies from that
sale. The Court finds that if Petitioner lives 20 more years, the
cost of the five acre parcel gets roughly close to what it would
cost him to pay for the survivor benefit.
is fair.
there

may

The Court finds that

The Court further finds that everybody agrees that
be

a

title

problem

on

this

five

acres

and

that

Petitioner may get less than what he's going to have to pay over
the time, but

finds that's the best the Court

can do. It is

equitable to give Respondent survivor benefit, but appropriate to

give Petitioner a source of funds with which to pay the survivor
benefit.
13.

In regards as to whether Respondent should comply with

all terms of the sales

for the various parcels of properties

since the entry of the Decree of Divorce, the court finds that
the position of Petitioner

is that Respondent

accepted

offers

that included terms of a grant deed, title insurance, and other
items, and that these were bona fide offers.
The Court finds that things like title insurance and things
like these other issues, normally in a closing on a sale, all
these things are deducted, including real estate commissions or
whatever they are, as closing costs.

The Court

further finds

that's what would have happened if the closing of these sales
contracts would have been sent to a third party.
The Court finds that if Petitioner wished to have Respondent
comply with the terms of the sales contracts, then Petitioner
should have done them prior to the time he sent payment.
The-Court finds Petitioner can argue that Respondent should
have been put on notice of the terms of the contracts because
they were in the contracts.
The Court finds that Respondent had not complied with the
terms of the sales contracts, but that Petitioner did not demand
compliance with

the terms of

the sales contracts until

after

payment had been made.
The Court

further finds the terms of the sales contracts

were more of a technicality than what the bargain was.

Thus the Court
going

to have

contracts.
contempt

is not going

to comply

with

to order that Respondent

any of

the

terms

of

the

is

sales

Consequently, Respondent shall not be held in

for not

complying any of the terms contained

in the

sales contracts of the various parcels of real property.
Respondent was not put on notice to perform all the terms of
the contracts before the checks for payment were sent; therefore,
the

Court

will

not

order

additional

performance

other

than

requiring Respondent to provide Petitioner with a grant deed on
property held by the parties by a grant deed and with a quit
claim deed on properties held by the parties on a quit

claim

deed.
As co-owner of the property by quit claim deed, Petitioner
cannot complain of not getting a warranty deed from Respondent.
Petitioner should not get better title than he had before;

he

takes the property like it was when he had it prior to adding
Respondent

to

the

title.

Respondent's

only

obligation

is

to

-pxovide Petitioner with the deed.
14. Each party shall pay for their own attorney fees.
15.

The court further finds that each party shall pay for

their own costs and expenses.

Petitioner's attorney shall

reimburse the Respondent, as agreed, $120.00.
the

cost

that

Respondent

incurred

for

This $120.00 is

Petitioner's

attorney

making a motion for continuing the June 2006 trial based upon the
death of Petitioner's attorney's aunt.

16.
title

to

The Court finds that in regards to Petitioner obtaining
the

various

properties,

Respondent

shall

convey

to

Petitioner titles to the various properties as follows: If the
parties acquired title to a parcel of property by a grant deed,
then Petitioner shall receive a grant deed from Respondent.
the parties acquired

If

title to a parcel of property by a quit

claim deed, then Petitioner shall receive a quit claim deed from
Respondent.

Respondent shall have three months from the date of

this ruling, July 5, 2006, to convey title to Petitioner for the
unconveyed titles of property.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1,

The Court concludes that the parties are subject to the

jurisdiction of

the Court

as set out above under the Court's

Findings of Fact, that the Petitioner is entitled to an Order
Modifying Decree of Divorce, the same to become final upon entry
herein.
2.

The Court concludes that all other issues of dispute

have been resolved with the Court pursuant to the above Findings
of Fact.
SIGNED and DATED this

\ W^day

of

/AV^^X

, 2007.

BY THE COURT
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law, postage prepaid, this 1^ day of ^ f j/( >,W^ , 2007,
to:
Judy Dawn Barking
Attorney for Respondent
427 27th Street
Ogden, UT 84401

Secretary

Michael D. Murphy (#5115)
Attorney for Petitioner
13 North Main
P.O. Box 15
Kaysville, Utah 84037
(801) 547-9274

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
WESLEY O. BAYLES,

)
)
)

Petitioner

ORDER MODIFYING
DECREE OF DIVORCE

vs.

)

LINDA CARYL BAYLES,

)

Civil No. 004702059

)

Judge Thomas L. Kay

Respondent.

This matter came on regularly scheduled before this Court
for trial on July 3, 2006, the Honorable Thomas L. Kay, District
Court Judge, presiding.
by

his

attorney,

Michael

Petitioner was present and represented
D.

Murphy,

and

the

Respondent

was

present and represented by her attorney, Judy Dawn Barking.

The

Court, after hearing argument and testimony and having reviewed
the parties' exhibits,and being fully advised in the premises,
and having previously entered on July 5, 2006 its Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law, now makes and enters the following
Order.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED:
1.

Pursuant; to the parties' stipulation, the

Petitioner

shall no longer be obligated to carry Respondent as a beneficiary
on his life insurance policy.

Bayles v Bayles
r\~A— \A„J c „ ^ -n*

I H i l l l l l l l f l I I I ! | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | j | | | j l|[[f l||| f i l l
-v~ ~c r\

~-__

_

•••I

2.

Pursuant to the Court's findings that Petitioner no

longer has the ability to pay alimony,

petitioner is disabled,

and the parties' incomes are substantially similar and there is
no way alimony can be justified.

Even if the Respondent needs

alimony, Petitioner cannot pay alimony, and the Court orders that
alimony shall terminate.
3.

The $12,000 in alimony payments made since 2004 shall

not be refunded.
the alimony

What alimony has been paid has been paid and

that was paid

shall not be repaid.

Both parties

shall go forward with no on-going alimony, or with no alimony to
be refunded or with no alimony due.
4.

The survivor retirement benefits shall continue to be

paid as they have been and Petitioner shall continue to pay for
it just as it has been in the past.

Respondent shall have no

obligation to pay any back survivor benefit payments.
5. As an off-set of the survivor benefits being paid as they
currently are, Petitioner shall receive the five acre parcel of
property, free and clear of any claim by the Respondent, subject
to any debt thereon.

Petitioner shall have full authority to

sell the five acre parcel and receive all monies from that sale.
6.

Respondent

shall not have to comply with any of the

terms of the sales contracts other than Respondent shall provide
Petitioner with a grant deed on property held by the parties by a
grant deed and with a quit claim deed on properties held by the
parties on a quit claim deed.

Respondent shall not be held in

contempt for not complying with all the terms contained in the
sale of the various parcels of real property.
Bayles v Bayles
Older Modifying Decree of Divoice

7. Each party shall pay for their own attorney fees.
8.

Each party shall pay for their own costs and expenses.

Petitioner's attorney shall reimburse the Respondent, as agreed,
$120.00.

This $120.00 is the cost that Respondent incurred for

Petitioner's

attorney making a motion

for continuing

the June

2006 trial based upon the death of Petitioner's attorney's aunt.
9.

Respondent shall convey to the Petitioner titles to the

various properties as follows:
a parcel

of property

by

If the parties acquired title to

a grant

deed,

receive a grant deed from Respondent.
title

to

Petitioner

a

parcel
shall

of

property

receive

a

quit

by

then

Petitioner

shall

If the parties acquired
a

claim

quit
deed

claim
from

deed,

then

Respondent.

Respondent shall have three months from the date of this ruling,
July 5, 2006, to convey title to Petitioner for the unconveyed
titled of property.
SIGNED and DATED this

day of
lAUv/i\
BY THE COURT

Bayles v Bayles

, 2007.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing Order Modifying Decree, postage prepaid, this ^_
da
Y of. 1 \/l)('k ^ / 2007, to:
Judy Dawn Barking
Attorney for Respondent
427 27th Street
Ogden, UT 84401

Secretary

Bayles v Bayles
Ordei Modifying Decree of Divoice

